Public

In order to provide key partners with a snapshot of state and local dynamics ahead of the 2020 election, Princeton Bridging Divides initiative prepared a series of state-specific "In Brief" summaries. Analysis draws on multiple public data sources, including the US Crisis Monitor, Mapping Police Violence project, ADL HEAT Map, SPLC Hate Map, and a variety of local news sources in order to present a state and county-level description of recent trends and actors of concern.

The Bridging Divides Initiative convened a small group of key stakeholders for a short AAR, scheduled for January 7, 2021 and rescheduled for February 3, 2021. Discussion is shared here in aggregate with approval of the group, but does not represent a specific consensus. Rather, summaries below represent a snapshot of early reflections and highlights areas where the groups largely agreed/disagreed, in the hope that all can learn and build on details here in the true spirit of an after-action review. The group sought to answer 4 key questions: (1) What was the greatest threat or cause of political and electoral violence? (2) How did this differ from what you expected pre-election? (3) What was most effective at preventing, mitigating and addressing political violence? What was the contribution your organization made toward addressing political violence? (4) What gaps did you see in the approach to mitigating political violence?

The post-election to inauguration period—the 11 weeks from Wednesday November 4, 2020 to Wednesday January 20, 2021—is a unique period of the US electoral calendar. Data on political mobilization and violence from this period tell us something both about what we might expect in the post-election period of future elections, and also offer a first glimpse of what we might see in terms of more immediate political violence in post-Trump America. January 6 was the highest-profile act of political violence in this period, a confluence of violence and an attack on our democratic system. By contextualizing it within broader trends of political mobilization during the election season, and especially post-election period, the data demonstrate how key elements of January 6 were patterns of behavior established well before the date: the timing, the topic, the location, and the increased presence of unlawful paramilitary and armed actors were all trends of political mobilization that foreshadowed the insurrection. The data also reveal, however, that other events could trigger contentious or violent behavior in the more immediate future.

Following the high profile role of unlawful paramilitary and “organized” armed groups in the events of January 6, much public attention and research has rightly turned to examining specific named, unlawful paramilitary groups. However, the majority of people arrested in connection with the Capitol attack were not affiliated with militia organizations. This brief looks at 416 instances of armed actors and incidents involving guns at protests, where the armed actors were not reported to be affiliated with a named paramilitary or militia organization.

As the first anniversary of the January 6 attacks approaches, national attention has turned to conflicting commemorations of the day itself. A brief period of bipartisan calls for accountability in 2021 ultimately gave way to revisionism, and in some cases outright conspiracy theories, including from some Republican lawmakers looking to maintain favor with former President Trump. One of the most concerning narratives includes framing arrested rioters as “political prisoners” by either denying documented actions or claiming cases are politically motivated. Few if any uses of the “political prisoner” narrative have been linked to wider calls to improve treatment for all prisoners or other criminal justice reform, suggesting attention on prison conditions is being used primarily to amplify divisive narratives and fear — rather than as an opening to engage on a topic with potential to promote bipartisan cooperation. Though currently limited in total number, the migration of these narratives from online discussion to offline demonstrations and activity merit specific attention. BDI reviewed two event-based datasets — The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Crowd Counting Consortium (CCC) — that monitor offline demonstration and certain political violence, to capture any publically reported events related to “January 6 Political Prisoners” or “Justice for Ashli Babbitt.”

On May 2, 2022, a leaked draft of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson revealed the likelihood the decision would overturn the 1973 precedent set by Roe v. Wade, which had generally legalized abortion. The leaked draft of Dobbs v. Jackson catalyzed immediate protests, with political mobilization continuing after the official release of the decision on June 24, 2022. The overturn of Roe v. Wade signals a major victory for anti-abortion rights (i.e. pro-life) activists, catapulting abortion and broader family planning access into the national conversation amidst the 2022 midterm elections. This Issue Brief examines emerging trends since the May 2nd Dobbs v. Jackson draft decision leaked, mainly focusing on offline mobilization. The brief contextualizes this activity within historical violence related to abortion and reproductive rights. It concludes with observations on potential activity moving forward into the 2022 election cycle.

The Bridging Divides Initiative (BDI) team conducted interviews in Grand Traverse, Michigan, to better understand the local realities of political violence in the United States and highlight community responses. To understand what this looks like in practice, BDI structured our text around drivers of conflict and community mitigation strategies taking place in Grand Traverse. While these are not the only points of tension or unity in Grand Traverse, this case study offers a snapshot of community response and an opportunity to highlight the complexities of a specific local context.

The Bridging Divides Initiative (BDI) team conducted interviews in Mecklenburg, North Carolina, to better understand the local realities of political violence in the United States and highlight community responses. To understand what this looks like in practice, BDI structured our text around drivers of conflict and community mitigation strategies taking place in Mecklenburg. While these are not the only points of tension or unity in Mecklenburg, this case study offers a snapshot of community response and an opportunity to highlight the complexities of a specific local context.

This report offers preliminary insights and reflections on the experiences of local municipal officials experiencing threats and harassment, in their own words, through conversations with 30 elected officials from across a broad range of locations, demographics, and ideologies.

The results of the first four rounds of the BDI-CivicPulse survey of 1,400 local elected officials offer sobering observations on the rate at which local leaders are experiencing insults, harassment, threats, and physical attacks for the preceding 12 months. This research is produced as part of an ongoing joint project launched by BDI and CivicPulse in August 2022 to conduct quarterly national surveys of local officials on their experiences facing threats and harassment. These quarterly updates allow us to identify spikes or shifts in hostility and monitor important trends in threats and harassment as we enter the 2024 election cycle.