HOSTILITY: Threats & Harrassment

In contrast to demonstrations in public spaces, protests around or outside of individual homes carry additional symbolic meaning, potential implicit threat, and, in some cases, legal restrictions. While threats and incitement to violence are not protected by the First Amendment, the line between protected peaceful protest at a home and unprotected threatening activity is by nature thinner, making it essential to frame any analysis in more specific details of intention and tactics. To examine the specifics of these current trends, Princeton Bridging Divides Initiative (BDI) drew on publicly available data compiled by the US Crisis Monitor as well as other open source reporting to provide specific descriptive and actionable insight on self-styled demonstrations that occurred outside of homes, as well as related threats or violence.

The results of the first four rounds of the BDI-CivicPulse survey of 1,400 local elected officials offer sobering observations on the rate at which local leaders are experiencing insults, harassment, threats, and physical attacks for the preceding 12 months. This research is produced as part of an ongoing joint project launched by BDI and CivicPulse in August 2022 to conduct quarterly national surveys of local officials on their experiences facing threats and harassment. These quarterly updates allow us to identify spikes or shifts in hostility and monitor important trends in threats and harassment as we enter the 2024 election cycle.

BDI produces regular state-focused situation reports (SitReps) on key risk trends and activity to help partners identify early warning signs of political or election violence in North Carolina.

BDI produces regular state-focused situation reports (SitReps) on key risk trends and activity to help partners identify early warning signs of political or election violence in Pennsylvania.

The eighth quarterly survey provides updated findings from the Q2 2024 nationally representative BDI-CivicPulse survey of local elected officials and school board members on their experiences of hostility. This wave surveyed over 400 local elected officials and 200 school board officials, putting the total number of participants across all eight survey waves at more than 3,500. This round of respondents was the first to be surveyed in the aftermath of the deadly shooting at former President Trump’s campaign rally in July. While levels of hostility faced by local elected officials remained consistently high from Q1 to Q2 ahead of the assassination attempt, there was a statistically significant increase in the proportion of local elected officials that said they were worried about future threats, harassment, and physical attacks following the shooting and moving into the election period. This research is produced as part of an ongoing joint project launched by BDI and CivicPulse in August 2022 to conduct quarterly national surveys of local officials on their experiences facing threats and harassment. These quarterly updates allow us to identify spikes or shifts in hostility and monitor important trends in threats and harassment as we enter the 2024 election cycle.

BDI assesses that the risk of disruption by actors of concern to the Rising Majority Movement Congress is low, based on a review of historic bad actor mobilization in the state and a scan of recent online activity. The risks of isolated security incidents, such as bomb threats or sole perpetrator attacks, are difficult to anticipate and could occur, but BDI analysts found no concerning posts in the days before the convening that might drive mobilizations or other incidents.

The ninth quarterly survey provides updated findings from the Q3 2024 nationally representative BDI-CivicPulse survey of local elected officials and school board members on their experiences of hostility. This wave surveyed over 400 local elected officials and 200 school board officials, putting the total number of participants across all nine survey waves at more than 4,100. This round of respondents was surveyed in the run-up to the 2024 election, covering their experiences between July and October. Compared to Q2, significantly more officials reported experiencing insults and harassment in Q3, while reports of threats continued at consistent levels. There was a decrease in respondents who reported worry about hostility following the previous survey round, which was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the shooting at President-elect Trump’s campaign rally, though the findings indicate that levels of concern remained at a high baseline going into the election period. This research is produced as part of an ongoing joint project launched by BDI and CivicPulse in August 2022 to conduct quarterly national surveys of local officials on their experiences facing threats and harassment. These quarterly updates allow us to identify spikes or shifts in hostility and monitor important trends in threats and harassment as we enter the 2024 election cycle.

Starting on November 6, numerous predominantly Black organizers, activists, and students across multiple states began receiving text messages with racist content telling them to report to their “nearest plantation” site. The texts came from various area codes, and were sent to recipients in at least Georgia, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Virginia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Ohio, and Alabama at the time of this report. These texts have since been widely reported to law enforcement. The VA Attorney General’s office has publicly confirmed they, and the FBI, are aware of the incidents. The language in the text messages appears to have originated from racist right-wing imageboards, including 4chan, as well as shared on a subreddit that has since been removed by Reddit moderators. An individual or individuals likely copy-pasted the text and used virtual phone numbers to send out the texts, selecting recipients based on their demographic profile. The recipient phone numbers could have been obtained via a data broker or a pre-existing data breach. We assess the security risk to individuals receiving the text messages is low, given the absence of additional personally identifiable information (PII) – such as recipients’ addresses – contained in the messages.

Using new data covering the full election period, this analysis maps key trends in election-related threats and harassment through the run-up to the vote and its immediate aftermath. It focuses on hostile activity targeting election officials, poll workers, election judges, and volunteers working in an official capacity to support the voting process.2 The findings provide a deeper understanding of the threat environment in which these civil servants carried out the 2024 election, and offer lessons for future election protection efforts going forward.